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CITIES AS A SOURCE OF CONSUMERS’ FINANCIAL 
EMPOWERMENT 
Susan Block-Lieb∗ 
Cities have been overlooked as a source of consumer protection.1 It is easy 
to see why. Cities are a poor place to situate consumer protection regulation, 
especially “top down” efforts to “command and control” lending decisions. This 
is especially true when lending occurs through national markets. As between 
federal, state and municipal regulators, and regulatory enforcement agents, cities 
come third in a field of three.  
Although some municipalities may be authorized to regulate,2 their 
regulatory jurisdiction is fragile because it is subject to reversal on two fronts: 
federal laws can pre-empt cities’ efforts to legislate, but so too can state law 
block municipal regulation.3 Moreover, regulation should only occur after 
extensive fact finding and opportunities for commentary are completed. Cities 
may not be well equipped to engage in the foundational work necessary as a 
precursor to regulation.4  
 
 ∗ Cooper Family Chair in Urban Legal Issues. Many thanks to Pam Foohey, Nestor Davidson, the staff 
of the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal, and my research assistant, Jon Hermann, Fordham 2018, for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1  For notable exceptions to this statement, see Kathleen Engel, Local Governments and Risky Home 
Loans, 69 S.M.U. L. REV. 609 (2016); Kathleen Engel, The State of Play in City Claims Against Financial Firms, 
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 82 (2014); Jonathan L. Entin, City Governments and Predatory Lending 
Revisited, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 108 (2014); Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City 
Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757 (2007). In examining cities as a source of 
consumer protection, this essay presumes without further analysis an important foundational premise: that 
consumers should be protected in their financial decision making.  
 2  As one example, New York City regulates across a wide range of industries and practices. It does this 
through its licensing and certification power, but also by rulemaking. For New York City’s consumer protection 
regulations, see CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, §§ 20-700 to 20-706, http://www1.nyc. 
gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/about/ConsumerProtectionLawPacket.pdf.  
 3  See Richard Briffault, What About the “Ism”? Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1342 (1994) (“The gist of the difference between state and local lawmaking 
authority is that every local law is potentially subject to two challenges whereas state laws are only subject to 
one.”); see also Nestor Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2017) (developing 
administrative jurisprudence to address distinct local regulatory and administrative bodies); Daniel B. Rodriguez 
& Nadav Shoken, Comparative Local Government Law in Motion: How Different Local Government Law 
Regimes Affect Global Cities’ Bike Share Plans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123, 143–53 (2014) (in building case 
for comparative urban law, describing relationship between local and state governments). 
 4  Recent efforts in several cities to tax or otherwise regulate soda in an effort to combat obesity have 
been challenged, and in one notable instance reversed. In 2014, the New York Court of Appeals held invalid the 
New York City “Portion Cap Rule” as an illegitimate exercise of legislative authority by the New York City 
Board of Health. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Com. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681 (2014). In 2016, the City of Philadelphia became the first major U.S. city to pass a soda 
tax. Laura McCrystal, Pa. Supreme Court to Hear Soda Tax Case, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 30, 2018), 
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Nor are cities likely to excel at the enforcement of federal or state consumer 
protection law.5 Although city actors can commence litigation to enforce these 
laws, few cities create positions like New York City’s Public Advocate,6 San 
Francisco City Attorney’s Office Affirmative Litigation Unit,7 and Miami’s 
Office of City Attorney.8 Cities often employ lawyers, to be sure, but generally 
these municipal lawyers defend suits brought against the city rather than initiate 
suits looking to protect the interests of the cities’ consumer residents. Cities’ 
standing to litigate to recover for damage to local communities—and so to the 
municipal tax base—is clearer now after the Supreme Court’s recent case in 
Bank of America v. City of Miami.9 But cities’ standing to bring suit has been 
 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/soda-tax-supreme-court-philadelphia-appeal-20180130.html. 
The American Beverage Association has appealed a Commonwealth Court’s decision to uphold the tax. Id. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to decide the appeal. See Williams v. City of Phila., Nos. 321 EAL 2017, 
No. 322 EAL 2017, 2018 Pa. LEXIS 639 (Jan. 30, 2018) (order granting Petition for Allowance of Appeal). By 
contrast, Chicago’s sugar tax was short-lived, as the Cook County Board of Commissioners voted to repeal it 
just months after its enactment. Caitlin Dewey, Why Chicago’s Soda Tax Fizzled After Two Months—And What 
It Means for the Anti-Soda Movement, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2017/10/10/why-chicagos-soda-tax-fizzled-after-two-months-and-what-it-means-for-the-anti-soda-
movement/?utm_term=.18c999de46f5.  
 5  If invested with sufficient resources, cities could become vital sources for enforcement of the federal 
consumer laws, given their knowledge and experience with the immediate impacts of the failure of consumer 
financial protection and their incentives to prioritize the interests of city residents. See, e.g., Kathleen Morris, 
The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012) (contesting Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburgh and articulating and developing a post-Hunter theoretical framework for local government 
law and law enforcement). For one group’s implementation of such advocacy, see Public Rights Project, 
https://www.publicrightsproject.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 6  The New York City Law Department houses an Affirmative Litigation division, which brings public 
interest lawsuits in the name of the City of New York, such as that recently commenced by NYC against the 
nation’s largest opioid manufacturers. For a description of the Affirmative Litigation Division, see Legal 
Divisions—Affirmative Litigation, N.Y.C. L. DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/html/divisions/affirmative-
litigation.shtml (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). For a description of the opioid suit, see Press Release, N.Y.C. Office 
of the Mayor, Mayor deBlasio Announces Lawsuit Against Nation’s Largest Opioid Manufacturers and 
Distributors (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/054-18/mayor-de-blasio-lawsuit-
against-nation-s-largest-opioid-manufacturers-distributors#/0.  
 7  The San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Unit pursues public interest causes of action under California 
law. For a description of the origins and work of the Unit, see Affirmative Litigation, CITY ATT’Y OF S.F., 
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/aboutus/teams/affirmative-litigation/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 8  For a description of the Office of the City Attorney in Miami and its work, see Practice Areas, City of 
MIAMI OFFICE OF CITY ATT’Y, http://www.miamigov.com/cityattorney/practiceAreas.html#litigation (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018).  
 9 Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (May 1, 2017).  
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narrowly cabined by the Court.10 As a result, cities’ abilities to protect residents 
through litigation remain limited.11  
Cities should, nonetheless, be understood as an important source of 
consumer protection, especially as to efforts to protect consumers by 
“empowering” them. When cities protect through empowerment, they are 
neither regulating nor litigating.12 Consumer empowerment might take the form 
of debt advice or education initiatives. Empowerment might also occur by 
enabling consumers to register complaints about lenders or other financial 
service providers’ conduct. It might involve financial inclusion initiatives to 
encourage banks and other institutions to provide financial services that are 
affordable and convenient to consumer residents, and non-predatory.  
Debt advice initiatives focus on strategies for resolving consumers’ 
problems of access to information, comprehension, learning, and self-
awareness.13 Financial inclusion programs encourage banks and other financial 
actors to locate conventional financial services in previously underserved 
neighborhoods so underserved communities can more easily access them.14 
Complaint registers and mediation programs offer consumers low-cost options 
for dispute resolution.15 Together, these sorts of empowerment initiatives assist 
in resolving a range of credit market failures by enhancing consumers’ abilities 
 
 10  Id. at 1298–99, 1306 (finding that City of Miami was a “person aggrieved” within meaning of Fair 
Housing Act (FHA), and holding that FHA’s proximate cause requirement demands “some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged” and directing lower courts articulate how 
“proximate cause” standard would apply to a city’s claims for lost property-tax revenue and increased municipal 
expenses). 
 11  For general commentary on the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Miami, see Fair Housing Act—
Standing and Proximate Cause—Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 131 HARV. L. REV. 373 (2017). For 
industry reaction to the decision, see Debbie Hoffman and Alexandria Decatur, REWIRED, HOUSING WIRE, Part 
1, The fallout of the Bank of America vs. City of Miami decision: An overview of the case and other present 
litigation (Sept. 26, 2017), available at https://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/41394-part-1-the-
fallout-of-the-bank-of-america-vs-city-of-miami-decision; Debbie Hoffman and Alexandria Decatur, REWIRED, 
HOUSING WIRE, Part 2, The fallout of the Bank of America vs. City of Miami decision: An overview of the case 
and other present litigation (Sept. 27, 2017), available at https://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/ 
41405-part-2-the-fallout-of-the-bank-of-america-vs-city-of-miami-decision.  
 12  See Yoon-Ho A. Lee & K. Jeremy Ko, To Empower, Prohibit or Delegate? Regulatory Strategies for 
the Consumer Credit Market (Jan. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 13  For a description of debtor education and counseling initiatives (which together are referred to herein 
as “debt advice”), see text accompanying notes 18–25, infra; see also Lee & Ko, supra note 12, at 14 (“By 
empowerment, we refer to any category of solutions designed to aid consumers’ decision-making so that they 
can maximize their economic welfare. It is one potential tool to remedy consumers’ epistemic failures and can 
involve making it easy for consumers to search for, learn about, understand, compare products and their usage, 
to properly calculate the cost, or to properly predict their behavior.”). 
 14  See infra Part I.B.  
 15  See infra Part I.C.  
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to make financial decisions rather than restricting lenders’ conduct in lending 
markets.16  
This is not to say, by any means, that empowerment strategies should be 
viewed as the most important form of consumer financial protection. Regulation 
and regulatory enforcement can be far more effective at resolving failures in 
consumer credit markets than are programs designed to enable consumers’ self-
help strategies. Empowerment strategies can, however, provide useful 
supplemental options in the consumer protection toolbox. And when 
empowerment options are relied on, cities are an especially good place to locate 
this sort of consumer protection because empowerment initiatives involve 
“bottom up” strategies of consumer engagement.  
I support these claims in roughly three steps. Part I describes various efforts 
to enhance consumer financial empowerment, including initiatives to (i) provide 
debt advice to consumers, (ii) enhance consumers’ financial inclusion, and (iii) 
enable consumers to register complaints about financial services and possibly to 
mediate those disputes. It also explores some of the limitations of each of these 
strategies for consumer financial protection. Part II, next, explains why cities 
can perform these particular sorts of consumer financial protection initiatives—
that is, empowerment initiatives—better than other levels of government. This 
explanation is focused on cities’ concentrated proximity to consumers, their 
existing infrastructures, and their uniquely pragmatic methods of work. Part III 
concludes by emphasizing the payoffs and limitations of emphasizing cities’ 
expertise in providing empowerment initiatives to resident consumers.  
I. 
This section describes three sorts of consumer financial empowerment 
initiatives:17 (i) debt advice; (ii) financial inclusion projects; and (iii) complaint 
collection, which is sometimes combined with mediation. Each of these 
initiatives aims to address some failure in the market for consumer credit. These 
market failures involve problems of access along three different fault lines: 
 
 16  For discussion of the distinction among consumer protection initiatives that empower, regulate and 
self-regulate, see Lee & Ko, supra note 12. 
 17  Although cities provide consumer financial empowerment, so, too, do the federal and state 
governmental actors. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau includes a division of Consumer 
Education and Engagement, which is divided among six offices: consumer engagement; financial education; 
students and young consumers; older Americans; service member affairs; and financial empowerment. See 
Bureau Structure, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/. This essay is mostly focused on municipal financial empowerment 
programs. 
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access to information; access to conventional financial services; access to 
justice.  
Empowerment initiatives try to provide consumers with do-it-yourself tools 
for tackling problems of access on their own. But remedies of consumer self-
help are difficult to implement: first, consumers are a diffuse group and thus 
difficult to reach; moreover, consumers may be slow to implement the strategies 
offered to them. Critics often fault empowerment initiatives as less likely than 
regulation to alter behavior and resolve market failures. These criticisms are also 
discussed. 
A. Debt Advice 
Consumer borrowers often lack access to the information they need to make 
good financial decisions. Mandatory disclosure regulation aims to reduce 
informational asymmetries in financial decision-making. Disclosure mandates, 
like those found in the Truth in Lending Act, can help,18 but disclosure mandates 
presume that consumer borrowers can access, comprehend, and actualize the 
information contained in them.19  
In other words, mandatory disclosure regimes are premised on the leap of 
faith that access to information should be equated with learning.20 In the same 
way that no one believes that a college education should consist of issuing a 
library card to incoming students and no more, many view disclosure mandates 
as a good starting point for answering consumers’ questions about loans, credit 
cards, payments and other financial transactions, but no more.21 Personal finance 
 
 18  Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 
THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN LENDING: THEORY, HISTORY, AND A WAY FORWARD 
(2011). 
 19 DURKIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 18, at 24; see also Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The 
Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. REG. 
181, 207–17 (2008) (discussing the need for financial disclosures to account for limitations of consumer 
comprehension). 
 20 OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: 
Rationality, Behaviorism, and the “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (2006); Susan Block-
Lieb, Richard Wiener, Jason A. Cantone & Michael Holtje, Disclosure as an Imperfect Means to Address 
Overindebtedness: An Empirical Assessment of Comparative Approaches, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT, AND 
BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Johanna Niemi, Iain Ramsay & William 
Whitford eds., 2009); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 149 PENN. 
L. REV. 647 (2011). 
 21  See, e.g., Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-
Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 216–34 (2005); William N. 
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is not as complicated as abstract algebra or organic chemistry, but it may be hard 
for individuals to pick up on their own. Few want to share their personal 
financial details with others, making friends and family a poor source of 
advice.22 Consumers may still have questions after mandatory disclosures are 
made available to them.  
To help in getting answers, some cities offer debt advice programs to their 
residents, whether one-on-one counseling or group educational initiatives. Cities 
might mandate or offer financial education in their public schools.23 Public 
libraries might host adult-ed classes and other opportunities for learning.24 Cities 
might also offer financial counseling in face-to-face settings.25 Whether it is 
offered on a one-on-one basis (counseling or coaching) or in a group setting 
(education), debt advice seeks to expand individuals’ understanding and 
appreciation of complex consumer finance transactions.  
In some settings, debt advice is mandatory.26 Public school systems may 
require their students to learn about financial topics.27 Before accessing federal 
bankruptcy jurisdiction, individual debtors have to demonstrate that they have 
participated in a “briefing” from an “approved nonprofit budget and credit 
 
Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic 
and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1128–35 (1984). 
 22  Susan Block-Lieb, Mandatory Protections as Veiled Punishments: Debtor Education in H.R. 975, The 
Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 425 (2003); Karen Gross, 
Establishing Financial Literacy Programmes for Consumer Debtors: Complex Issues on the Platter, in 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Iain Ramsay, William Whitford, & Johanna Niemi-
Kiesilainen eds., 2003). 
 23  National Conference of State Legislatures, List of Financial Literacy Legislation pending in 2017, 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/financial-literacy-2017-legislation. 
aspx (last visited April 27, 2018). 
 24  See, e.g., Business & Career Services, BROOKLYN PUB. LIBR., https://www.bklynlibrary.org/business 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2018); Adult Education Classes by Subject, PUB. LIBR. CINCINNATI & HAMILTON CTY., 
http://www.cincinnatilibrary.org/main/adultedclasses.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2018); Adult Basic Education, 
ARLINGTON PUB. LIBR., http://arlingtonlibrary.org/adult-learning-programs/abe/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). 
 25  New York City offers financial counseling to its residents. See Get Free Financial Counseling, N.Y.C. 
CONSUMER AFF., (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dca/consumers/get-free-financial-counseling.page. 
Other major cities, such as Denver, Philadelphia, and San Antonio similarly provide free financial counseling to 
their residents. See Press Release, Denver Mayor’s Office, Mayor Hancock Opens Seven Centers to Provide 
Free Financial Counseling Services to Low Income Residents (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.denvergov.org/ 
content/denvergov/en/mayors-office/newsroom/2013/mayor-hancock-opens-seven-centers-to-provide-free-
financial-coun.html; City of Philadelphia, Financial Empowerment, http://www.phila.gov/fe/pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2018); City of San Antonio, Financial Empowerment Center, http://www.sanantonio.gov/ 
humanservices/FinanceEmergency/financialempowerment (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). 
 26  Block-Lieb, supra note 22. 
 27  See, e.g., Ann Carns, Most States Don’t Require Specific Financial Literacy Classes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/your-money/states-financial-literacy-classes.html. 
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counseling agency;”28 they also have to complete a separate “personal financial 
management” course as a condition of obtaining a discharge at the conclusion 
of their bankruptcy case.29 Housing counseling may be required: when certain 
first-time homebuyers look to finance their purchase with a “high-cost” 
mortgage; when some elderly homeowners look to refinance their retirement 
with a “reverse” mortgage.30  
If consumers voluntarily seek to obtain either counseling or education on 
financial topics they may find a paucity of providers, although to some degree 
this is changing. Some employers offer financial counseling—usually but not 
always focused on investing and insurance decisions—as a benefit to their 
employees.31 Financial counseling is also offered by the armed forces to military 
personnel.32 Increasingly, cities offer financial counseling and courses to their 
residents, sometimes modeled on New York City’s Office of Financial 
Empowerment.33  
Debt advice initiatives are surprisingly controversial. It may be unsurprising 
that mandatory counseling and mandatory education is controversial since at 
least some of the individuals subject to the mandate may view the requirement 
as unnecessary, expensive, and ineffective.34 Mandatory anything is 
controversial in the United States. Voluntary financial counseling and education 
initiatives are also controversial, however.  
 
 28  11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2012). 
 29  Id. § 524. 
 30  For the CFPB’s Interpretive Rule on housing counseling relating to high-cost mortgages, see Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, Homeownership Counseling Organizations Lists and High-Cost Mortgage 
Counseling Interpretive Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 22091 (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.federalregister.gov/ 
documents/2015/04/21/2015-09244/homeownership-counseling-organizations-lists-and-high-cost-mortgage-
counseling-interpretive-rule. For HUD’s Final Rule on reverse mortgages, see Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 7094 (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-19/pdf/2017-01044.pdf.  
 31  See, e.g., Stephen Miller, Is 2017 the Year of Employee Financial Wellness Programs?, SOC’Y FOR 
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/ 
financial-wellness-trend.aspx (noting an increase in employer-provided financial education that focuses on 
retirement, student loan debt management, and day-to-day budgeting). 
 32  See Personal Finance, MIL. ONESOURCE, http://www.militaryonesource.mil/web/mos/personal-
finance (last visited Mar. 17, 2018); see also CFPB Releases Updated Exam Procedures for Military Lending 
Act, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-releases-updated-exam-procedures-military-lending-act/ (noting regulatory efforts by the 
CFPB to promote fair and safe access to credit by U.S. service members). 
 33  Susan Block-Lieb, Consumer Financial Protection, Inclusion and Education: Connecting the Local to 
the Global, in LAW BETWEEN BUILDINGS 82, 90 (Nestor Davidson & Nisha Mistry eds., 2017). 
 34  Id. 
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To some, the most controversial aspect of credit counseling, debt settlement, 
budget planning, and similar efforts is that historically some of this debt advice 
has been extended either through non-profit entities hiding their for-profit 
backing and predilections, or for-profit entities engaging in predatory advice 
giving.35 Moreover, financial literacy and financial wellness initiatives may be 
expensive, especially when considering the dynamic nature of the consumer 
lending markets and the need for consumer borrowers to revise their learning 
about these markets periodically and likely frequently.36 Not every city 
government is able to finance or even offset the cost of these programs. The 
internet lowered the cost of providing financial education, but it might also have 
watered down its content.37  
Some critics focus their concerns about these programs on the lack of sound 
empirical grounding for financial literacy initiatives.38 Empirical analysis of 
counseling and educational offerings is hampered, to a large degree, by a failure 
to agree on goals and so on the metrics for measuring success in attaining these 
goals.39 Empirical analysis is also made more difficult by the diversity of debt 
 
 35  See generally Susan Block-Lieb & David Friedman, Indirect Regulation: The Political Economy of the 
Credit Counseling Industry (on file with author); Tracie R. Porter, The Field Between Lions and Zebras . . . 
Evening the Playing Field Between Lenders and Borrowers: Conflicts of Interest and Legal Obligations in the 
Residential Mortgage Transaction, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 623 (2012). The IRS has responded to abuses by 
non-profit credit counseling organizations by revoking bad actors’ tax-exempt status. See IRS News Release IR-
2006-80 (May 15, 2006), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-takes-new-steps-on-credit-counseling-groups-
following-widespread-abuse. Federal and state agencies have also brought actions against debt-settlement 
service providers and budget planners, which differ importantly from credit counseling entities, for abusive 
practices. See CFPB Sues Freedom Debt Relief for Misleading Consumers About Its Debt-Settlement Services, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-freedom-debt-relief-misleading-consumers-about-its-debt-settlement-services/; Press 
Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., New York State Banking Department Issues Order Against CB Budget 
Planning Corp. (May 21, 2008), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea080521.htm. 
 36  Lee & Ko, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that educational initiatives “may be cost-ineffective where the 
content of the information to be delivered to consumers is constantly fluctuating and need perpetual updating”). 
 37  For discussion of the bankruptcy debt advice mandate for these programs to be offered over the Internet 
or telephones, see, e.g., Michael D. Sousa, Just Punch My Bankruptcy Ticket: A Qualitative Study of Mandatory 
Debtor Financial Education, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 391, 439 (2013) (noting that financial counselors believed in-
person counseling sessions to be more successful than those over the phone or internet, as those sessions 
provided greater opportunity for those counselors to know and understand their clients); Katherine Porter, Going 
Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 969, 1024 (2005) (discussing the 
illusory relief to debtors in rural communities from the internet or telephone-based financial education courses, 
as many such debtors are likely to discontinue their internet service to ease their financial burdens). 
 38  See, e.g., Robert S. Alder & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an 
Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. REG. 159, 161 (1984); Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology 
in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 419 (2009).  
 39  For discussion of the challenges of such empirical research, see, e.g., DOUGLAS J. LAMDIN, ED., 
CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS (2012); Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Sumit 
Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, & Douglas D. Evanof, Financial Literacy and The Effectiveness of 
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advice that gets offered: diversity in where the programs get offered and by 
whom; there is also a wide range in the content of these courses.  
Oversight of financial literacy programs exists through the federal 
government, but national oversight does not unify the provision of debt advice 
in the United States. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau collects and 
analyzes data and submits an annual report to Congress on financial literacy; it 
provides financial literacy materials to assist educators, military personnel, 
librarians, and other practitioners. But the CFPB is not the only federal initiative 
on financial education and counseling. Earlier, Congress tasked the Department 
of Treasury to create a Financial Literacy Education Commission. FLEC created 
a website and hosts conferences,40 and these initiatives appear not to coordinate 
with those offered through the CFPB.41 Together the CFPB and Treasury’s 
FLEC provide lots of light touches and little in the way of convergence or 
unification of these programs.  
My point here is not that debt advice programs ought to follow a single 
script. The diversity of debt advice initiatives may well be justified by the 
distinct needs that different consumers face, depending on their age, income 
level, and geographic location. But the diversity of these initiatives complicates 
any study of whether these initiatives can succeed and, if so, what elements 
enhance the likelihood for success.  
Despite controversies about the effectiveness of financial education and 
counseling efforts, these programs have expanded in the past decade or so.42 
 
Financial Education and Counseling: A Review of the Literature, in FINANCIAL LITERACY IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE (Olivia S. Mitchell and Annamaria Lusardi eds., 
2012). 
 40  For information about Treasury’s FLEC, see Resource Center, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financial-education/Pages/commission-index.aspx.  
 41  FLEC originates out of Treasury. Although the CFPB does not appear to sit on this Commission, FLEC 
also includes the heads of 19 additional federal agencies: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; Federal 
Reserve; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Federal Emergency Management Agency: National Credit 
Union Administration; Securities and Exchange Commission; Departments of Education; Agriculture; Defense; 
Health and Human Services; Housing and Urban Development; Interior, Labor, and Veterans Affairs; Federal 
Trade Commission; General Services Administration; Small Business Administration; Social Security 
Administration; Commodity Futures Trading Commission; Office of Personnel Management; White House 
Domestic Policy Council. Id. 
 42  For example, between 2008 and 2018, Financial Empowerment Centers (FECs) have provided free, 
public counseling services to over 80,000 clients in twelve cities to assist with personal debt reduction, credit 
improvement, creation of safe bank accounts, and future personal savings. See Press Release, Cities for Financial 
Empowerment Fund, Wells Fargo and Cities for Financial Empowerment Fund Expand Access to Free Financial 
Counseling (Mar. 15, 2018), http://cfefund.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CFE-Fund-FEC-Public-Wells-
Fargo-Expansion-Final-Release.pdf. 
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Expansion has occurred at the federal level, to be sure, but not exclusively. Cities 
have, importantly, leapt into the fray. 
In 2006, during Michael Bloomberg’s first term as Mayor, New York City 
opened its Office of Financial Empowerment (OFE). Among the programs 
offered through New York City’s OFE were a range of debt advice initiatives. 
These programs were popular and, by the time Bloomberg left office in 2013, 
OFE had opened numerous offices across the five boroughs of New York City.43  
After leaving the office of mayor, Bloomberg funded a non-profit 
organization—Cities for Financial Empowerment (CFE)—that looked to carry 
on and also expand nationally on the work of OFE.44 The longstanding head of 
New York City’s OFE left the City’s employ to head CFE, ensuring that the 
message and methods of OFE would get consistently implemented across the 
country through a network of similar municipal offices. CFE oversees a coalition 
of fifteen core city-members. CFE coalition members and additional cities have 
opened their own Offices of Financial Empowerment, with CFE’s assistance and 
oversight.45 There exist fifteen CFE programs in cities across North America.46 
CFE assists cities in creating and implementing these offices, as well as studying 
their programmatic success.47 
B. Encouraging Greater Financial Inclusion 
Huge numbers of consumers have trouble accessing conventional financial 
services, like checking and saving accounts, because bank branch offices aren’t 
located in their neighborhoods.48 As a result, residents in these “banking deserts” 
 
 43  NYC DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS OFFICE OF FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT: PROGRESS REPORT, 
2010–2013 20 (2013), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/partners/Research-OFEProgressReport 
20102013.pdf. 
 44  For information on the founding of CFE, see About the Coalition, CITIES FOR FINANCIAL 
EMPOWERMENT FUND, http://cfefund.org/coalition/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).  
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. 
 47  CITIES FOR FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT FUND, AN EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT 
CENTERS: BUILDING PEOPLE’S FINANCIAL STABILITY AS A PUBLIC SERVICE (2013), http://cfefund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/FEC-Evaluation.pdf.  
 48  See Increasing Economic Opportunity for African Americans: Local Initiatives that are Making a 
Difference: Hearing before the J. Econ. Comm., 113th Cong. 10, 22, 51 (2014); see also Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, FDIC 2015 National Survey Unbanked and Underbanked Households (October 2016) 
(estimating that 7.0 % of households in U.S. were unbanked in 2015, or approximately 9.0 million households, 
and that an additional 19.9 % of U.S. households, that is 24.5 million, were underbanked), available at 
https://www.economicinclusion.gov/surveys/2015household/documents/2015_FDIC_Unbanked_HH_Survey_
Report.pdf. 
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may turn to high-cost fringe providers—payday lenders, check cashers, 
pawnshops.  
This is not a new problem, despite the shifting vocabulary aimed at 
diagnosing and resolving it. At the turn of the twentieth century, poor 
immigrants lived from paycheck to paycheck and turned to loan sharks for 
respite. They had no other place to turn for credit, at the time. Because low-
income borrowers were more likely to default on personal loans than more 
affluent borrowers, banks closed their doors (and coffers) to them.49 This lack 
of financial access was upended in the early twentieth-century when Progressive 
Era political pressure mounted at both the state50 and federal level.51 As a result 
of enabling legislation enacted in response to these pressures, lawful consumer 
credit markets arose in the early twentieth century.52 By the late 1970s and early 
1980s, consumer credit markets grew up: they extended nationally and as a result 
of technological developments.53  
National consumer credit markets were still divided in the late twentieth 
century, to be sure, but they were no longer divided along state territorial 
borders. Instead, two new cleavages arose: First, mortgages, car loans, and 
credit-card lending divided between prime and sub-prime borrowers. Below this 
two-tiered market of consumers with credit ratings and access to conventional 
financial services (although not at a single price point) grew a third “fringe 
market” of borrowers who did not have access to conventional financial 
institutions and, thus, who would have had a “zero” credit rating (as distinct from 
a “low” rating).  
 
 49  See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 173–76 (2011); William 
C. Apgar & Allegra Calder, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage 
Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 101, 
102–03 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005). 
 50  I leave for another day discussion of the history of the development of consumer credit markets through 
the political entrepreneurship of the Russell Sage Foundation, which in an alliance with the American 
Association of Personal Finance Companies, successfully lobbied for the passage of the Uniform Small Loan 
Law in thirty-four state legislatures. See Elizabeth Anderson, Bruce G. Carruthers, and Timothy W. Guinnane, 
An Unlikely Alliance: How Experts and Industry Transformed Consumer Credit Policy in the Early Twentieth 
Century United States, 39 SOC. SCI. HIST. 581 (2015).  
 51  I also leave aside the story of Progressive Era reform of federal banking laws that led to the creation of 
federally chartered industrial banks, credit unions, thrifts and savings and loan institutions. Others have explored 
this history in detail. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, 
AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015); MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND 
THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2017). 
 52  See HYMAN, supra note 49. 
 53  Id. 
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These divisions in early twenty-first century consumer credit markets 
created two sorts of problems. One problem was a disparity in regulation. Fringe 
lending was not extended by (at least not directly by) financial institutions, and 
so fringe lenders were, for the most part, unregulated until the creation of the 
CFPB. Another problem existed, as well: a disparity in the price and non-price 
terms on which credit was offered. Prime borrowers paid the lowest interest rates 
across national consumer credit markets; sub-prime borrowers paid more than 
prime borrowers; fringe borrowers paid substantially more than even sub-prime 
borrowers and at this price could access only short-term, small dollar loans. 
Because the financial products offered to fringe and sub-prime borrowers were 
designed to ensure profit despite the potential for high default rates,54 the terms 
on which this money was lent was not only more expensive (e.g., higher interest 
rates and more non-interest fees), these terms were also more onerous (i.e., 
harsher remedies on default). Regardless of whether consumer lenders were 
regulated financial institutions (i.e., banks), federal regulators mostly declined 
to regulate the harsh terms found in these credit contracts.  
To some extent, local actors sought to fill this regulatory void. State 
legislators adopted statutes to address unfair and deceptive acts and practices.55 
Sometimes state legislators enacted laws to limit these practices and state 
attorneys general brought suits to enforce them.56 Municipal actors also sought 
to protect resident consumers, but as noted above cities’ abilities to regulate or 
enforce regulation are less than ideal.57 Given that one problem with consumer 
credit markets is financial constraint, cities and other local actors supplemented 
regulations with financial inclusion programs aimed at enhancing financial 
access.  
An increasing number of states, counties, and cities have gotten engaged in 
encouraging banks to provide financial services in underserved neighborhoods 
through a range of these financial inclusion initiatives.  
 
 54  Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2186–88 (2007).  
 55  See generally CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
STATES: A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS (2018) (comparing unfair and 
deceptive practices laws across all fifty states). 
 56  See, e.g., Millennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. State of Fla., 761 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000). Individual consumers have sued fringe lenders in private actions. See, e.g., Clarence E. Boschma v. 
Home Loan Center, Inc. 198 Cal. App. 4th 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). Private rights of action are limited, however, 
both in terms of the state law causes of action available for consumers to bring suit under and also because 
individuals may be bound by an arbitration clause that precludes litigation before any court, whether state or 
federal. For one of many Supreme Court decisions enforcing an arbitration/class waiver clause in a consumer 
contract, see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
 57  See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text. 
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1. Banking Development Districts 
Through its Banking Development District (BDD) program, the New York 
State Department of Financial Services committed to depositing state and 
municipal funds in state chartered banks if they opened branch offices in 
underserved communities, many of which were low-income neighborhoods in 
New York City.58 Reporting on ten years of experience, the NYS Department of 
Financial Services described its BDD program as a qualified success, although 
modifying the program to require enhanced community outreach and debt advice 
initiatives.59  
2. Land Banks 
The Cook County Land Bank presents another example of a “partnership” 
between local government (Cook County and the City of Chicago) and private 
and non-profit actors to encourage the provision of conventional financial 
services to underserved neighborhoods.60 The Land Bank acquires vacant 
properties left abandoned in the wake of the mortgage foreclosure crisis and, by 
extinguishing delinquent taxes and liens and, in some cases, demolishing 
buildings, prepares these properties for re-conveyance back to “the market.”61 
3. Bank On and Related Initiatives 
Cities have also worked to encourage banks to provide convenient, 
affordable, non-predatory financial services to underserved residents through 
programs like Bank On San Francisco and Bank On Atlanta.62 The goal of these 
 
 58  N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96-d (McKinney’s 2017) (enabling creation of banking development district 
program. For more information about the BDD program, see The Banking Development District (BDD) 
Program, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/banking/bdd.htm; see also Block-Lieb, supra note 33. 
 59  See NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, COMMUNITY AFFAIRS UNIT, CONSUMER SERVICES 
DIVISION, 10 YEARS IN: A REPORT ON THE BANKING DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT PROGRAM (May 2010), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/banking/bddreview.pdf.  
 60  Cook County Land Bank Authority Marks 200th Home Rehab Milestone in Communities Hit by 
Foreclosure Crisis, COOK CTY. GOV’T (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.cookcountyil.gov/news/cook-county-land-
bank-authority-marks-200th-home-rehab-milestone-communities-hit-foreclosure. The Cook County Land Bank 
Authority, formed in 2013 pursuant to a Cook County ordinance, is a unit of Cook Country government, and 
works in partnership with the City of Chicago and other community stakeholders. About Us, CCLBA, 
http://www.cookcountylandbank.org/about/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 61  See also Cook County Land Bank Authority Board of Directors Meeting, CCLBA (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.cookcountylandbank.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-7-2015-Board-Packet.pdf.  
 62  See, e.g., Pamela Miller, Mayor Kasim Reed Announces Bank On Atlanta Initiative, AJC (Dec. 20, 
2017), http://www.ajc.com/news/local/mayor-kasim-reed-announces-bank-atlanta-initiative/FwZl33wIxWhuo 
K6x4hz63I/ (describing initiation of Bank On Atlanta program and noting that Atlanta effort was inspired by 
2006 Bank On San Francisco). 
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programs is to provide free or low-cost checking and savings accounts to 
unbanked residents; low cost financial services are often combined with access 
to free or low cost debt advice.  
The success of Bank On programs has varied. For example, Bank On San 
Francisco reports that more than 10,000 Bay area residents have opened 
checking accounts annually through the initiative since it started in 2006.63 Bank 
On Manhattan never reached a similar number of account openings;64 by 2012, 
New York City abandoned its Bank On Manhattan initiative in favor of a similar 
program organized through its Office of Financial Empowerment. OFE’s current 
program covers a broader geographic area than Bank On Manhattan did, in that 
it assists residents from all five boroughs of New York City, not just Manhattan. 
More importantly the OFE program enabled residents to open free NYC 
SafeStart (savings) and DirectDeposit (checking) accounts.65  
C. Collecting and Mediating Consumers’ Complaints 
Some borrowers have legal and other problems with their financial 
obligations and yet face difficulties in obtaining access to justice or any sort of 
help with dispute resolution. Opening small claims courts to borrowers may help 
with this, but some of these disgruntled borrowers cannot access courts at all 
because they are already committed to arbitrating. Small claims courts do not 
provide access to justice for consumers hamstrung by arbitration clauses. 
Moreover, some borrowers’ problems may not rise to the level of a legal problem 
requiring judicial resolution. Small claims court filing fees and the time involved 
in bringing such a suit might prompt disgruntled consumer borrowers to simply 
“lump it”—that is, ignore their financial concerns and, thus, fail to bring these 
concerns to the attention of other potential borrowers. 
 
 63  See Bank On San Francisco, S.F. OFFICE FIN. EMPOWERMENT, http://sfgov.org/ofe/ofe-bank-san-
francisco (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).  
 64  See Heidi Evans, Bank On Manhattan Program Allows New Yorkers to Open Savings or Checking 
Accounts for $25, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/bank-
manhattan-program-new-yorkers-open-savings-checking-25-article-1.157412.  
 65  For details about both of these programs, see Manage Money, N.Y.C. CONSUMER AFF., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dca/consumers/manage-money.page (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). The SafeStart 
account charges no monthly or overdraft fees but requires depositors to a minimum monthly balance of $25.00. 
See Opening a Savings Account, N.Y.C. CONSUMER AFF., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dca/consumers/open-
savings-account.page (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). The DirectDeposit accounts provide free checking accounts 
for those NYC residents whose employers participate in the program by agreeing to deposit paychecks directly 
into the account. For details, see NYC Direct Deposit for Employees, N.Y.C. CONSUMER AFF., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dca/consumers/checking-employees.page (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).  
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Dissatisfied consumer borrowers might guide others away from problematic 
lenders by means of a far cheaper medium: word of mouth. This “remedy” is 
also imperfect. Borrowers are sometimes unwilling to tell others about their 
experiences with default—their financial foibles may be too embarrassing or 
otherwise too private. Moreover, word of mouth does not spread easily in 
national lending markets.  
Reputation intermediaries arise in some markets to assist with these sort of 
problems, but markets in reputation intermediation face their own distinct 
problems.66 One is practical: until recently, complaints would have gotten 
collected in filing cabinets; this information was easily forgotten without 
resolution and difficult to share outside the neighborhood in which the 
complained-about lender is located. With the advent of the internet and advances 
in data collection and processing, consumers’ complaints moved from filing 
cabinets to social media, largely resolving these practical problems.67 The 
internet has not solved the second problem reputation intermediaries face—
namely, their difficulties in building trust.68 Reputation intermediaries collect 
and disseminate information about others’ reputations, but also need to build 
their own reputations for trustworthiness. Generally, both sorts of problems can 
be resolved by creating a market for the information distributed by the reputation 
intermediary; but where the actor seeking information is not the entity paying 
for its collection and dissemination, conflicts of interest can arise. 
The Better Business Bureau (BBB) is a good example of this sort of conflict 
of interest.69 The BBB is a non-profit entity organized to act as a reputation 
intermediary in a wide range of markets for consumer goods and services, 
including financial services.70 It accepts consumer complaints and mediates 
 
 66  See generally Susan Block-Lieb, E-Reputation: Building Trust in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 
1199, 1201 (2002) (analyzing the role of online reputation intermediaries in electronic marketplaces). 
 67  The internet did not obviate the need for reputation intermediaries in this context. Consumers learned 
that they could complain about services and products over the internet and communicate their concerns directly 
to one another. Complaining about experiences in financial markets over the internet advanced consumers’ 
interests to some degree. But unless individuals’ concerns grew viral, they still were easily buried and ignored 
by the entities complained about. Collective action in this realm was, on its own, not enough because it bore no 
consequences. 
 68  See Block-Lieb, supra note 66, at 1216–19. 
 69  The Better Business Bureau is not the sole reputation intermediary in consumer markets. Consumers 
Union presents a competing model. See Consumers Union, http://consumersunion.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 
2018). So does the Business Consumer Alliance. See Business Consumer Alliance, https://www.checkbca.org/; 
see also https://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/company-b/internet/business-consumer-alliance-misrepresentation-
extortion-and-slander-colton-california-1202622. 
 70  The Better Business Bureau was founded in 1912 as a nonprofit organization for advancing 
marketplace trust and consists of roughly 100 independently organizations located throughout the United States 
and Canada. These local BBBs are coordinated under the Council of Better Business Bureaus, which is a non-
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these disputes;71 it also “ranks” businesses and only allows certain businesses to 
brand themselves as BBB-approved.72 Problematically, however, BBBs finance 
themselves by selling “memberships” to the Bureau. When it ranks businesses 
as “BBB Approved,” the Better Business Bureau only ranks fee-paying 
members; although the BBB purports to engage in extensive research before 
accepting businesses as members and assigning BBB rankings to them, media 
reports question the worth of these rankings.73 In a 2015 investigation, for 
example, reporters from CNN found that “the BBB’s rating system is seriously 
flawed—resulting in grades that appear to be arbitrary and change erratically.”74  
To assist complaining consumers with the cluster of problems that prevent 
access to remedy or justice in the markets for consumer finance, governments 
got involved. With the Consumer Financial Protection Act, enacted as Title X 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress directed the newly created CFPB to create a 
complaint section, to monitor the complaints it collects, and to respond to these 
complaints.75 But federal assistance in collecting consumers’ complaints and 
requiring banks and other entities to respond to these complaints in a timely 
fashion may be insufficient (and indeed is not designed) to resolve every 
complaint.76 At very least, critics note, the success of the CFPB’s complaint 
register will depend on the extent to which it devotes its scarce resources to it, 
as compared to the Bureau’s taste for engaging in other sorts of consumer 
 
profit entity located in Arlington, Virginia. See History and Traditions, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, 
https://www.bbb.org/atlanta/get-to-know-us/history-and-traditions (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 71  See File a Complaint, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/consumer-complaints/file-a-
complaint/get-started (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 72  See Overview of BBB Rating, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/council/overview-of-bbb-
grade (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 73  See, e.g., Joseph Rhee and Brian Ross, Terror Group Gets A Rating from Better Business Bureau?, 
ABCNEWS (Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/business-bureau-best-ratings-money-
buy/story?id=12123843. Attorneys general have gotten involved in investigating the BBB. See, e.g., BBB=Bad 
for Business Bureau: Atty Genrl exposes the scam, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
vgXLc1cGhGU (Nov. 21, 2010) (Connecticut attorney general press conference). 
 74  See Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, Slammed by the Government, A-rated by the Better Business 
Bureau, CNNMONEY (Sept. 30, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/30/news/better-business-bureau/index. 
html.  
 75  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1969 (2010); 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A). 
 76  See, e.g., Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint 
Mechanism, 7 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 83, 85 (2012) (“The biggest weakness in the CFPB’s 
complaint framework is that it will always fall well short of its goals” and “may erode the overall level of 
consumer protection.”); Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall, & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early 
Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343 (2014) (analyzing 110,000 
consumer complaints to assess timeliness of company responses and other factors). 
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protection (such as regulation, enforcement, and supervision).77 While there may 
be ways to proactively sort among the enormous amounts of data created by this 
complaint function, wading through the details will involve energy and 
creativity, as well as the expenditure of staff time.78 
Cities have also gotten involved in collecting consumers’ complaints about 
financial products and services.79 Like that at the CFPB, these city-organized 
complaint functions can serve as a forum for venting and information sharing, 
including possibly with the federal government. Some, like that made available 
to Chicago residents through its municipal website, provide a mechanism for 
complaining to municipal civil servants.80 Others, like San Francisco, do less: 
San Francisco simplifies for its residents the process of submitting a consumer 
complaint with the CFPB in that its municipal website serves as a “collection 
agent” or portal for accessing the CFPB’s federal complaint register, but does 
not otherwise devote City of San Francisco resources to the task of collecting or 
resolving such complaints.81 Other cities, like New York City, do more: New 
York combines its complaint registries with city-organized mediation of 
consumers’ complaints and encourages residents to follow the progress on this 
mediation by means of its 311 hot line.82 
II. 
Cities are a superior location for providing financial empowerment 
programs, and for three reasons. First, cities enjoy greater proximity to consumer 
constituents than state or federal government actors, and in greater 
 
 77  See, e.g., Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMPLE L. REV. 895, 944–46 
(2015) (drawing inspiration for her analysis from William Whitford’s and Spencer Kimball’s Why Process 
Consumer Complaints? A Case Study of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin, 1974 WIS. 
L. REV. 639 (1974)).  
 78  For description of a methodology for searching in the CFPB complaint register so that regulators sort 
between an expression of anger and frustration on one hand and sadness and fear on the other, and the analytical 
benefits of such sorting, see Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer 
Protection, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177 (2017). 
 79  Importantly, these complaint registers are not precluded by arbitration clauses. Nor would even 
mandatory mediation options connected to complaint registers be precluded by most arbitration clauses.  
 80  For access to Chicago’s general consumer complaint function, see City of Chicago, File A Complaint 
With BACP, https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/bacp/supp_info/file_a_complaintwithbacp.html (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 81  For the City of San Francisco’s portal from its municipal website to the complaint registry hosted by 
the federal CFPB, see City and County of San Francisco, Office of Financial Empowerment, https://sfgov.org/ 
ofe/submit-consumer/complaint (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 82  For directions on how to file a complaint with the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs 
and to track progress on mediation of this complaint, see NYC Department of Consumer Affairs, Resolve a 
Complaint, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dca/consumers/file-complaint.page (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
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concentrations. Second, cities are used to working pragmatically in tandem with 
private and nonprofit actors. These partnerships are often the keys to 
successfully empowering consumers’ financial decisionmaking because the 
success of empowerment initiatives often depends on garnering the trust and 
confidence of the participants. Third, cities’ existing municipal infrastructures, 
such as public schools, libraries, 311 call centers, and other social welfare 
services, also provide important programmatic advantages. Each of these 
benefits is detailed in the sections that follow. 
A. Location, Location, Location 
Cities are “concentrated,” in that residents live in heavily populated settings. 
Moreover, cities are “local,” which is to say that city governments are 
immediately proximate to their constituents. As a consequence of these physical 
realities, city governments face distinct political realities. Municipal 
governments exist to meet residents’ demands for local infrastructure and local 
services.83 Infrastructure and service demands are not uniquely local, but these 
demands are especially intense at the city level because concentrated living 
creates social frictions that residents look to city governments to alleviate.84  
Historically, demands for local infrastructure and services have tended to 
focus on police power, land use, education, and public health and safety 
concerns. But cities and states have also long been used to providing consumer 
financial protection to their residents, as well.85  
Before national markets for consumer finance arose in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, this local consumer financial protection mostly took the form of 
usury laws and licensing regimes: both of these involve regulation.86 As 
consumer finance markets grew to become national markets, this local consumer 
financial protection regulation got pushed aside. Congress enacted numerous 
federal consumer laws over the period. These federal laws preempted much local 
regulation. But in the early 2000s, predatory lending grew in these national 
consumer finance markets. Federal regulators resisted enforcing existing federal 
 
 83  See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 417–18 (1956). 
 84  See Edward L. Glaeser et al., Consumer City, 1 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 27 (2001) 
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laws to reduce predatory lending in national markets.87 An interest in local 
consumer financial protection re-emerged. State and city agents moved to 
protect local residents with local initiatives.  
Because this essay focuses neither on this second wave of local regulation 
to promote consumer financial protection nor on local enforcement of federal 
consumer protection laws, it leaves for another day the question of whether 
regulation of consumer finance markets should occur at a national, state, or local 
level. The claim here is simply that city governments are uniquely capable of 
implementing empowerment initiatives. Perhaps because of the narrowness of 
my claim in this essay, however, it is important to emphasize that federalism 
should play no part in comparative analysis of the location of programs aimed 
at consumer empowerment.  
Consumer empowerment initiatives look to affect consumers’ behaviors 
rather than the behaviors of lenders engaged in national markets. As a result, the 
logic that uniform, national implementation should always be preferred over 
locally-based strategies holds none of the same intuitive appeal it might enjoy 
when discussing consumers’ protection through regulation or regulatory 
enforcement. Consumers’ interests in empowerment initiatives are purely local 
ones. There is no particular need for empowerment strategies to be uniform 
across the country.  
There are, to be sure, distinctions to be drawn between different sorts of 
empowerment initiatives. Debt advice programs are by nature locally focused 
because they often get provided face-to-face. Complaint functions usually do not 
work face-to-face. Still, complaint registers differ when implemented on a city 
rather than a federal basis because they can focus on complaints about local 
vendors and lenders and their local practices. Similarly, financial inclusion 
initiatives focus on financial deserts, and so too benefit from detailed familiarity 
with banks’ neighborhood presence. Regulators’ proximity to consumers 
matters to some degree with all sorts of empowerment programs. 
B. Building on Existing Infrastructures 
Cities’ unique access to local infrastructures assists in the creation and 
implementation of these sorts of empowerment services. 
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As mentioned above, debt advice often gets provided face-to-face. Cities are 
uniquely equipped to provide face-to-face education and counseling services as 
a result of their close proximity to consumer residents. Cities’ existing local 
infrastructures are also especially important when providing debt advice to 
residents through public schools and public libraries.  
Even when consumer residents seek access to municipal financial 
empowerment programs over the internet or telephone, cities’ provision of 
empowerment initiatives can be aided by modern municipal infrastructure, such 
as 311 hot lines and trusted municipal websites on the internet. Consumer 
residents can register complaints about financial service providers on internet 
websites. Some cities, like San Francisco, treat their municipal complaint 
register as a portal into the CFPB’s federal complaint system. Others, like New 
York City, extend their city complaint function beyond anything offered by the 
federal government. Once a New Yorker’s complaint is lodged over the internet, 
the complaining consumer can request mediation of the issue through NYC’s 
Department of Consumer Affairs; consumers can also follow the progress of this 
mediation over 311 hot lines.88 Consumers can also get information about bank 
branches in their neighborhoods from municipal websites, even though Google 
Maps might direct them elsewhere. These websites might also assist local 
consumers in comparing the cost of conventional saving and checking accounts 
to store-front check cashers with access to real-time information about local 
practices, again through trusted city websites.  
C. Partnering Pragmatically 
The success of empowerment initiatives often depends on building 
relationships of trust and familiarity. This is especially true where cities offer 
municipal agencies as reputation intermediaries. The physical proximity of 
(local) municipal civil servants to resident consumers can help in building these 
relationships of trust. So, too, can municipal civil servants’ pragmatic methods 
of work assist in securing relationships of trust with city residents. 
When city actors work together with pre-existing intermediaries, such as 
municipal housing authorities, libraries, and public schools, consumers’ trust in 
empowerment services may be enhanced. Networks of private-nonprofit-and-
public actors can also lever existing relationships of trust. Although the federal 
and state governments have struggled in implementing public-private 
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partnerships, cities have long worked pragmatically through these sorts of 
relationship. This experience is critical to building out empowerment initiatives. 
D. Networks of Cities 
Cities have learned that working together and networking with other cities 
can assist them in protecting and empowering consumer residents. There may 
be no need to re-invent the wheel with these projects. Cities can help each other 
with their experiences and the lessons learned.  
Cities for Financial Empowerment (CFE) connects cities looking to open 
Offices for Financial Empowerment like the OFE opened in New York City in 
2006. So does Bank On, an entity that assists cities interested in replicating in 
their municipality a program like Bank On San Francisco.  
III. 
Cities’ provision of consumer empowerment services aids the project of 
consumer financial protection in several distinct ways.  
A. Highlighting Empowerment Programs 
First, cities’ work in this context highlights the extent to which 
empowerment strategies can and should be relied on to protect consumers in 
their financial decision-making. Empowerment strategies have been sidelined as 
the least important methodology in consumer regulators’ toolboxes. 
Empowerment strategies are even sometimes characterized as a dangerously 
distracting placebo. But most of this criticism is best aimed at federally focused 
empowerment strategies. When empowerment occurs with the benefit of a more 
local perspective, its chances of success improve.  
If I have convinced you that cities are a comparatively superior source of 
consumer empowerment, then perhaps I have also convinced you that we should 
not give up on empowerment initiatives. I am not saying that empowerment 
initiatives should replace regulation or enforcement. Definitely, they should not. 
At very least, however, in reviewing empowerment programs we should be 
careful to distinguish between critiques of federal empowerment initiatives and 
critiques of any sort of empowerment no matter the location of its provision.  
Perhaps, as well, state and federal governments could do more to enable 
cities to fund the building and expansion of local infrastructures that assist in 
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strengthening consumer empowerment programs. More federal funding could 
be made available for 311 hotlines, for example. 
B. Cities as a Source of Consumer Protection: Moving Beyond Empowerment 
There is also a second payoff that emerges from this analysis: In identifying 
cities’ strengths as providers of empowerment services, I have also identified 
cities’ strengths as a source of consumer financial protection more generally. 
Some of cities’ strengths could be inculcated at other levels of government. 
Cities’ proximity to consumers, existing infrastructures, and pragmatic methods 
of work could to some degree be replicated to assist state and also federal 
regulators in drafting, implementing, and enforcing regulation. 
If state and federal regulators can supplement and strengthen each other’s 
efforts with a belt-and-suspenders approach, then cities should be viewed as 
providing the elastic waistband that further supplements this consumer financial 
protection. In assisting federal and state regulators, cities can offer what they do 
best: closer access to local practices and market effects. City agents know better 
what’s happening on the ground than distant state and federal actors. 
C. Bringing the Local to the Federal 
There’s also a third potential payoff here: cities can “teach” federal and state 
actors to better regulate and enforce regulations with an eye on the “local.” 
Cities’ strengths as sources of consumer financial protection could be developed 
and built out at other levels of government. Of course, cities’ proximity to their 
consumer residents cannot be replicated at the state or federal level, at least in 
any physical sense. State and federal regulators could, however, look at city 
practices and recognize that keeping their ears closer to the ground is a good 
strategy.  
The Federal Reserve, FTC and SEC have long possessed regional offices 
and other forms of local connections to supplement their federal ones. The CFPB 
could do the same. Moreover, in setting up a regional presence, federal and state 
regulators should recognize that local presence does not need bricks and mortar 
or boots on the ground. 
In addition, cities’ unique infrastructure and pragmatic methods of work 
could get replicated at the state and federal level. State and federal actors do not 
need regional offices in order to benefit from information gleaned from cities’ 
internet websites and 311 hot lines, for example. Cities could share this 
information with state and national actors. Some already do this. But federal 
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websites could do more to improve themselves after studying cities’ 
experiences. 
Finally, federal and state actors could learn from cities’ implementation of 
empowerment initiatives. For example, like New York and other cities, the 
CFPB empowers consumers through its complaint portal. There is not any 
mediation component to the federal complaint function. Cities, however, 
especially NYC, have learned that mediation initiatives marry well with these 
complaint functions. The federal government could learn from these and other 
concrete state and local initiatives aimed at encouraging greater financial 
inclusion, such as New York’s Banking Development Districts, San Francisco’s 
Bank On projects could become more effective if they had federal heft behind 
them.  
CONCLUSION 
Empowerment initiatives are a worthwhile tool when looking to provide 
consumers protection from various failures in markets for consumer credit and 
related services. Cities excel at providing empowerment initiatives. In 
explaining why it is I think cities are best at empowering consumers, I have also 
hinted at how cities can usefully play a role in regulating consumer financial 
protection and regulatory enforcement, as well.  
Nothing in this essay alters the intuition I began with: Cities are an imperfect 
and incomplete source of consumer protection. But given current leadership at 
the CFPB, which is not very interested in using the belt that Congress gave the 
federal government, cities may want to tighten their elastic waistbands, doubly 
so when the city is located in a state that wears its suspenders loosely.  
 
